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Child support and the Government’s children’s socio-economic rights 
obligations 
 
Lara Walker  
 
Abstract 
This article argues that the recovery of child support is a vital aspect of ensuring children’s 
socio-economic rights. The UK Government has a legal responsibility to assist parents to meet 
the needs of their children whether by providing specialist support or through welfare 
payments. The Government cannot fulfil this responsibility by requiring parents to reach 
private agreements and failing to provide suitable additional support. The current law and 
policy focus purely on the duty to maintain. It is assumed that each parent has the   
responsibility to provide for their children, and there is no back up support under the Child 
Support Act where the parents are unable to do this. This fails to acknowledge and resolve 
wider social issues which are crucial to ensuring that child support is received, and children 
are not living in unnecessary poverty. The article argues that by taking this approach the 
Government is failing to fulfil its responsibility to protect children’s socio-economic rights. 
This article sets out a socio-economic rights framework for amending child support legislation 
and policy, highlighting the bare minimum Government obligations.  
 
1. Introduction 
The law and policy under the Child Support Act 1991 (CSA) places responsibility to pay child 
support with the child’s parents through the concept of duty to maintain. Successive 
governments have developed child support law and policy in a haphazard way, and its many 
failings are well documented (see for example Abbott 1996, Millar 1996, Davis et al 1998, 
Wikeley, 2007, Bryson et al 2013, DWP, 2016, and Gingerbread, 2019). Unfortunately, many 
children do not receive child support, and some children receive very little money or irregular 
payments. The current law and policy treats child support as an independent issue without clear 
consideration of family structures and problems. The framing of child support as a matter of 
individual responsibility, that is currently isolated from the context of social assistance and 
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family structures has allowed the Government to avoid its responsibility to protect the socio-
economic rights of children. This framing also results in a failure to meaningfully utilise child 
support to address poverty and other social justice issues.  
This article argues that the current framing of child support on the principle of the duty to 
maintain is too narrow. The Government needs to look beyond this and search for a more 
comprehensive framework, which looks beyond parental responsibility. Child support should 
be about providing for children, as suggested by New Labour (Henshaw, 2006), and the 
Government needs to do more to make sure the policy is workable and children are provided 
for. Unfortunately the CSA was not adapted to reflect the philosophy in the Henshaw Report, 
and instead the Act and its formulas remained firmly focussed on the duty to maintain. 
Overtime Governments have  pushed child support further into the private sphere, and there is 
limited support through the benefits system where the non-resident parent (NRP) is unable to 
pay, or doesn’t pay. This is problematic because children of single parents are at greater risk 
of poverty than other children, and these parents are normally women. 
The child support law and policy needs to be revised to help resolve these wider issues. 
Previously Altman has posited a number of theories for child support, but all these theories 
place responsibility with either the child’s parents or the Government (2003). He ultimately 
opts for a theory that places responsibility with the parents on the basis of remedying a parental 
wrong and to prevent harm to the child. This is problematic for a number of reasons,1 but 
primarily because it leaves a gap for many children as there is only so much parents can do. It 
is also incorrect to place the focus solely on Governments. Instead both parents and the 
Government should be responsible for providing for children. This dual-responsibility can be 
best articulated through children’s socio-economic rights. This article argues that child support 
is a vital aspect of protecting children’s socio-economic rights, in order to better provide for 
the needs of children. The article argues for a new conceptual framework for child support, 
which highlights what the Government’s minimum obligations should be under this new 
framework, and demonstrates that the Government needs to take this approach in order to 
comply with its existing children’s socio-economic rights obligations. This article will now 
consider the Government policy on child support, before outlining the Government’s 
responsibilities in relation to child support under the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (UNCRC). Importantly the article will then propose a new framework that 
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complies with children’s socio-economic rights and considers the minimum duties of parents 
and Governments under this model.  
 
2. Government Policy: child support, benefits and the wider family law context 
Family law has traditionally been about enabling fair outcomes, promoting social justice and 
ensuring the welfare of family members (Mant and Wallbank, 2017). The original goal of 
promoting social justice and welfare was to minimise inequality (Mant, 2017), which was in 
line with the aims of the welfare state (MacGregor, 1999, 91; Kaganas, 2017, 171). However, 
this does not sit well with Thatcherite and later Conservative policies, as well as austerity 
measures.  Current family law focuses on the “autonomy and responsibility” of the individual, 
placing family law into the private sphere. Self-reliance and independence have become 
dominant themes in social policy (Herring, 2014), and allowing individuals to manage their 
own affairs is held up by the Government as a win-win (Mant, 2017). This is because it 
promotes “autonomy” and saves money. Diduck argues that the use of the word autonomy is 
politically attractive because it implies choice and respect (2016, 96). However, this concept 
of self-reliance has previously been heavily criticised in relation to the welfare state (Goodin, 
1985). This is because the aims of the welfare state are social cohesion and collective 
responsibility, whereas individual responsibility provides for the opposite (MacGregor, 1999, 
91). This individualised approach has been apparent across family law as a whole since the 
introduction of LASPO (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012), which 
largely saw the removal of legal aid from family law. Post LASPO dealing with family matters 
privately is deemed to be the responsible approach, to the extent that an attempt for ‘access to 
a legal and public service is recast as irresponsible’ (Diduck, 2016, 104). However, it is 
arguable that this dominant approach of individual autonomy, responsibility and saving public 
expenditure in child support policy under the CSA predates LASPO. 
The CSA 1991 was introduced under Thatcher’s Conservative Government. Although some of 
the original aims were commendable, and included social and moral claims such as lifting more 
single mothers and their children out of poverty (White Paper Vol I), this aim was derailed by 
the Treasury’s wish to cut public expenditure (King and Crewe, 2014). The resulting policy 
and law meant that all single parents on benefit had to direct their child support claim through 
the child support agency, and all the money collected then went back to the treasury to replace 
the benefits that had already been paid. Therefore the original policy did absolutely nothing to 
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reduce child poverty, because the benefits themselves were not high enough to provide for 
these children. Children did not receive any additional funds through the scheme, instead public 
transfers were substituted for private transfers (Wikeley, 2006, 122), and paying parents (who 
may also be living below the poverty line) had to give a percentage of the money they did have 
back to the Government. There was no room for autonomy for parents on benefits, because 
they were forced to use the agency so that the Government could control payments and use 
these payments to reduce public expenditure. Therefore, although the White Paper was initially 
entitled Children Come First, it has been stated that it should have been entitled the Treasury 
Comes First (HC Deb, 1990). Parents not claiming benefits were free to choose whether to use 
the agency or to reach their own private agreements and make autonomous decisions. This 
effectively established a “two-tier” system in the UK (Wikeley, 2006, 496) and this view of 
the CSA is still prevalent today.  
The aim of reducing public expenditure was seen throughout Thatcherite policy, and this left a 
demolished social infrastructure, fragmentation, inequality and poverty (MacGregor, 1999, 
93). The policies diminished many aspects of the welfare state including the premise of social 
citizenship and social cohesion brought about by the Beveridge Report (1942).2 While post-
war benefit levels may never have been regarded as generous, the gap between benefit levels 
and average earnings increasingly widened during Thatcher’s rule, as a result of cutbacks in 
some areas of social security provision (Harris, 2000, 27). Research has demonstrated a 
disparity between income support rates and the funds needed to purchase the items that many 
regard as necessities, and are therefore needed to provide a suitable standard of living (Harris, 
2000, 26, and see section 3 below). In sum poverty rose rapidly across the UK during 
Thatcherism (Kakabadse et al, 2012; Shaw, 2007; Van der Putten 2005; ComRC, 1995).   
New Labour then attempted to reframe child support policy and made a link between child 
support and the child poverty objective (Henshaw, 2006; Wikeley, 2006, 140). However, 
although there were key changes to the Act, and the wider social welfare provisions, there was 
still ‘very little discussion of the fundamental principles which should underpin the child 
support regime’ (Wikeley, 2006, 139). The Green Paper only allocated one page to the 
discussion of these principles, but this page did include a reference to the right of children to 
care and support from their parents (DSS, 1998; Wikeley, 2006, 139). The policy (outlined in 
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the Henshaw report) placed primary responsibility with the parents,3 but also recognised that 
the State had a role in alleviating child poverty and should provide back up where necessary. 
Therefore, this policy did have resonance with children’s rights and the approach of the 
UNCRC (discussed below at s 3.3). The child support policy set to achieve this by allowing 
parents to retain all the child support paid, on top of any benefits they were entitled to (Miles, 
2011). However, the CSA still referred to the duty to maintain, and there were no further 
underpinning objectives, such as a right to the child support, mentioned in the Child 
Maintenance and other Payments Bill 2007 or the updated Act (Wikeley, 2007). The updated 
child support formula (discussed at section 3.3.2), also worked on this premise focussing on 
the income and expenditure of the NRP rather than the needs of the child. 
The other element of Labour’s approach was the start of the push for autonomy through the 
language of responsibilities.  Parents were to try and reach their own private agreements on 
child support and only use the agency where necessary (Henshaw, 2006). There was a clear 
policy shift towards encouraging private agreements, with the emphasis being on private 
ordering (Wikeley, 2007). The Government attempted to do this by trying to influence 
individual behaviour, rather than providing a state service (Taylor-Gooby, 2010). 
Unfortunately, without adequate advice and support services there is a risk of reinforcing power 
imbalances between parents (Wikeley, 2007). This change meant also meant that single parents 
on benefit no longer had to use the agency, and all parents could decide to have a private 
agreement. The change had the potential to dramatically reduce the case load of the Agency, 
which was struggling to operate efficiently, however, this did not happen (Wikeley, 2007). The 
new framework had a clear commitment to private ordering, but the revised CSA still failed to 
provide specific foundations on the purpose of child support, despite the initial rhetoric, and 
the only basis remained the duty to maintain. 
The Henshaw Report also linked child support to Labour’s wider poverty targets, and their 
view that the welfare system should tackle child poverty and social exclusion. The link between 
child support and poverty targets was a positive step, and these poverty targets were eventually 
encompassed in the Child Poverty Act 2010. More broadly Labour continued to promote a 
philosophy of economic self-reliance and focussed on employment as a way out of poverty 
(DSS, 1998, 3805). However, this philosophy came with substantial benefits to support 
families, particularly single parents (Dickens, 2011, 9). Those who had access to these benefits 
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tended to earn more income from benefits than from their private income. Therefore, the return 
to employment was heavily supported by benefits and was a carrot rather than stick approach 
(Dickens, 2011, 9). Both absolute and relative poverty rates fell under the Labour Government, 
and they fell by a higher rate for children in single parent households (Dickens, 2011, 11-16). 
In terms of poverty targets Labour opted for relative poverty targets, rather than absolute 
poverty targets. Relative poverty targets can be harder to meet than absolute poverty targets, 
particularly when median income is rising. This is because they are not just about changing the 
real incomes of poor children, but changing their incomes in line with wider changes in median 
income and therefore measuring the distribution of income between different households 
(Dickens, 2011; Harris, 2000). Harris argues that the consideration of relative poverty targets 
is arguably more consistent with the aims of the UNCRC, than seeking to apply an absolute 
standard alone (2000, 15-16). Under the Labour Government absolute poverty fell by a greater 
degree than relative poverty, due to increases in median income over the period. Although the 
relative poverty targets were not met, there was still a vast decrease in relative poverty and the 
increased benefit payments to single parents reduced the relative poverty rate among these 
households by 16.8 percentage points (Dickens, 2011, 16). However, by 2009 a third of 
children in the UK were still living below the poverty line (Kakabadse et al, 2014, 87), so 
despite these important improvements in policy it was arguable that children’s rights were still 
not met (Children’s Rights Alliance for England, 2009). 
Since then there have been negative changes in the context of child support and child poverty 
introduced by the Coalition Government, followed by the Conservatives. There is a huge 
emphasis on reaching private agreements, which Douglas argues has rendered child support as 
a matter of personal preference rather than a legal obligation (2016, 12). Fees were introduced 
for using the child maintenance service to help with the collection of maintenance in August 
2014. This sees a further move towards individual responsibility and autonomy, regardless of 
the circumstances of the child and the parents. The Government is trying even harder to push 
family law into the private sphere by introducing financial consequences for those who want 
help from the publicly funded agency. Assistance with the recovery of child support is now 
portrayed as a service (Diduck, 2013), which lone parents must pay for.  
These Governments have also made a number of changes to social security policy which reduce 
the payment of benefits. The level of poverty in the UK indicates that the benefits available are 
below assessed need (Alston, 2018) and are insufficient to support single parents (Browne, 
2016 and see section 3.2 below). Deeming and Smyth highlight that the UK has one of the 
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lowest unemployment benefit replacement rates in OECD countries, with lone parent families 
with two children only receiving 40% of what they would receive in employment (2015). These 
reductions have increased through policies such as the benefit cap and the two-child policy.4 
Lady Hale has stated that the benefit cap breaks the link between benefit and need and those 
affected will not receive the sums of money necessary to adequately house, feed and clothe 
themselves and their children (R.SG and Others v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2015] UKSC 16 [180]). Although it is clear that benefits are limited and insufficient to support 
needs, studies have shown that additional income from child support can make a vast difference 
to lone parents and their children. These studies have shown that when child support is actually 
paid on a regular basis then this can help to lift children out of poverty (Cuesta and Meyer, 
2014; Skinner et al, 2012; Hakovirta 2012; Cuesta et al, 2018; Bryson et al, 2013). The DWP 
found that in some cases direct pay child support received represents a substantial proportion 
of annual household income (2016, 104). However, child support can only make a difference 
in cases where the obligation is enforced. 
The Conservatives have also removed the poverty targets introduced under the Child Poverty 
Act (Stewart and Roberts, 2018), and decoupled child support and poverty objectives. The new 
Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 is framed around life chances and social mobility. The 
new policy focusses on “worklessness” (DWP, 2017), forcing people to choose work in line 
with the approach taken in regard to social security measures. Individuals do have more access 
to funds if they can work for 16 hours a week, because this alters the way in which the benefit 
cap applies, so they can retain benefits and supplement this with private income, but this is not 
always practical (R (on the application of DA and others) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions (Respondent) R (on the application of DS and others) (Appellants) v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Respondent) [2019] UKSC 21(DA and DS)). The 
use of ‘life chances’ means that the Act is now framed around some wider qualitative measures, 
but it has removed quantitative measures to measure poverty rates. The Social Mobility and 
Child Poverty Commission argue that the lack of measures to assess child poverty progress is 
unacceptable, because a strategy that cannot be measured is meaningless (2014). It allows the 
Government to ignore the impact of welfare cuts, because they no longer have a clear poverty 
measure to be held to account by. It is important to have a number of poverty measures, as 
poverty contains many facets (Waggle, 2002; 2018; Redmond, 2008), however, economic 
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measures remain significant and need to be retained if there is to be further progress in reducing 
child poverty (Calder, 2018; Dickens, 2011; Kakabadse et al, 2014). Since 2010 there has been 
an  increased privatisation of child support, the decoupling of child support from poverty, and 
the removal of child poverty assessment measures. The next section of this article will 
demonstrate that these changes taken as a whole mean that the government is not fulfilling its 
existing obligation to protect children’s socio-economic rights. 
3. Socio – economic rights and the UNCRC in the UK 
3.1 Introduction  
Children’s socio-economic rights, which are protected under the UNCRC, provide a legal 
mechanism which require that the needs of children and families are met. These rights relate 
to factors like adequate food, shelter, clean water, formal education and access to primary 
health care (Nolan, 2014), some of which the benefits system fails to uphold (Hale, SG [2015]).  
Fundamentally their ‘raison d’etre is to uphold human dignity’ (Van Bueren, 1999). These 
rights underpin factors that are necessary for the development of the child and the protection 
of the child’s best interests. Under the UNCRC, it is primarily the responsibility of the parents 
to fulfil these needs. However, in some cases there might be multiple interacting factors that 
need to be resolved, which extend beyond parental ability (Belsky, 1993). This is where the 
Government is supposed to step-up and provide assistance, but there is no provision for 
financial assistance under the current child support framework, which only refers to the duty 
of the parents. The Government is failing to uphold its responsibilities in this area, through the 
privatisation of child support, and numerous benefit cuts in order to reduce public expenditure 
(see section 3.2-3.3 below for more detail). 
The UK has ratified the UNCRC, but not implemented it. The legislature is bound by the 
Convention and is obliged to give effect to the socio-economic rights obligations under the 
UNCRC (Heymann et al, 2015; Nolan 2014), but the UNCRC is not directly applicable in 
court. It does, however, provide a source of interpretation in the context of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), (see below at section 3.4). This is particularly 
important in the context of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR and has also been discussed in the context 
of A1P1 during the benefit cap cases (SG; DA and DS [187]). Governments can comply with 
the instruments they have ratified through legislation, policies and budgets (Heymann et al, 
2015; McCall-Smith, 2019), and the UK Government is legally bound to respect the rights set 
out in the Convention, and to take all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures 
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to ensure the rights are realised (Arts 2 and 4). The legislature has committed to giving the 
UNCRC due consideration when making policy and legislation. The Cabinet Office guidance 
encourages impact assessments to be undertaken on legislative changes to ensure children’s 
rights are considered (The Government, 2016). Further, ‘[a]ll law and policy development, 
administrative and judicial decision-making and service provision that affect children must 
take account of the best interests principle.’ (ComRC, 2006 [13]). Lord Kerr has described this 
as a duty ‘to keep faith with the spirit of the Convention’ (DA and DS [2019]).  
In order to effectively protect children’s socio-economic rights the Government is required to 
take a combination of both positive and negative action, and provide varying levels of resources 
(see for example Goodin, 1986; Waldron, 1984; Landau, 2012). This positive action includes 
a duty to provide appropriately funded services to ensure children’s socio-economic rights are 
protected (McCall-Smith, 2019; Vadenhole, 2014). Maximum available resources should be 
allocated so these services are properly funded (Elson, 2012; Vandenhole, 2014; ComRC, 
2003; 2016a), and these services must help families protect children’s rights and create an 
environment where children can grow and reach their potential. Currently the Government is 
taking minimal action, reducing its responsibility by pushing child support into the private 
sphere. It is also failing to provide resources by charging for the services which are available. 
This article will now look at the provisions under the UNCRC which are most relevant in the 
context of child support. It will start by considering the role of the cross-cutting principle of 
the best interests of the child under Article 3 UNCRC (ComRC; Hanson and Lundy, 2017) in 
the context of child support.5 It will then consider Article 27, which recognises that a child has 
a right to an adequate standard of living and is the key article in regard to child support, before 
considering the role of the judiciary in this context.   
                                                          
5 This article will not consider the important cross-cutting concept of the views of the child in Article 12 
UNCRC in any detail. This is because Article 12 requires that children are heard in judicial and administrative 
proceedings, and there are rarely any ‘proceedings’ in child support cases under the CSA. The new framework 
adopted by this article is still based on a formula, so legal proceedings in individual cases will remain rare 
because the agency simply applies the formula which provides a maintenance obligation under the CSA. There 
are proceedings in relation to more complicated enforcement mechanisms, and in those situations authorities 
would have to consider whether it was appropriate to hear the child in accordance with Article 12 UNCRC. 
However, the agency can proceed automatically with standard enforcement mechanisms, in which case there 
would be no proceedings (see footnote 18 for further details on enforcement mechanisms). When the 
Government is revising its child support policy in accordance with the children’s rights framework, it should 
consult children generally as part of this process to comply with the wider purpose of Article 12, particularly in 
relation to the development of material assistance and support programmes which should be provided under 
Article 27. Children should be included in the social process of developing community and society and ‘State 
parties should carefully listen to children’s views wherever their perspective can enhance the quality of 




3.2 The best interests of the child  
Article 3 of the UNCRC requires that the best interests of the child is a primary consideration 
in all actions concerning children. Under the Convention the requirement to take the best 
interests of the child into account falls on legislative bodies, administrative authorities, courts 
and social welfare institutions. The standard that the principle should be observed by a range 
of bodies is designed to make the principle more effective, so that it is always a consideration 
in actions concerning children. In many cases, however, there can be competing considerations 
which is why the best interests is a primary consideration and not the paramount consideration. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the best interest principle should be key consideration which 
Article 3(2) recognises is an important aspect of child wellbeing. This cannot be appropriately 
addressed by pushing child support into the private sphere. 
The best interests of the child can only be supported through protecting family well-being, and 
this includes shielding children from the negative effects of poverty. Growing up in poverty 
can affect the development of the child in a number of ways (O’Brien, 2018). For example it 
can have negative effects in relation to both physical and mental health (Cooper and Stewart 
2017; Ayre 2016). It can hinder achievement in education (Cardiff Council, 2013; National 
Education Union and CPAG, 2018; NEU Survey 2019), and go on to affect long-term outcomes 
(Griggs and Walker, 2008; Nolan, 2014) which would include access to work. This conflicts 
with Government policy goals which are hinged on independence through entry into the 
workforce, because the negative effects of poverty on young children can impair their ability 
to work in later life. Violations of basic socio-economic rights, such as access to suitable 
shelter, food or heating, that arise as a result of poverty inflicted by a reduction in benefits (SG 
[180]; DA and DS [33] and [37]), will have a more significant and protracted effect on children 
compared to adults (Nolan, 2014,15-16; DA and DS [34]) . The Committee on the Rights of 
the Child considers that early childhood is a particular crucial time when babies and infants are 
especially vulnerable to poverty, family breakdown and multiple other issues that violate their 
rights and undermine their well-being (2006). This is of particular concern in the context of 
family breakdown because in most countries lone parent families are at the greatest risk of 
poverty (Barcena-Martin et al, 2018; Bradshaw et al, 2018; Gornick and Jäntti, 2012). 
The Institute of Fiscal Studies found that recent increases in absolute child poverty rates in the 
UK are much higher in lone-parent families than in couple families (Browne, 2016). In 
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2017/18, 43% of lone parents were living in poverty, which is almost twice as high as any other 
family type (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2020, 20). This coincides with the finding that 
parents claiming child support under the CSA comprise a relatively low-income group 
compared to the general UK population, with 46% reporting an income of less than £15,600 a 
year (DWP, 2016, 25). Some of these lone-parents are now further negatively impacted by the 
two child policy (Sefton et al, 2019), and the benefit cap (DA and DS [22]). Lone parents are 
also more likely to be from an ethnic minority or have a disability in comparison to the general 
population (Gingerbread, 2018, 4). This level of poverty is unnecessary in the UK economy, 
which is still relatively wealthy, and it stems from increasing inequality in wealth distribution. 
This is the result of the focus on autonomy and individual responsibility, austerity and the 
reduction of social welfare. These polices do not support the best interests of the child and 
family wellbeing. 
It is clear that lone parents, and their children, are more likely to live in poverty and suffer more 
under the austerity cuts. In the cases of SG  and  DA and DS the UK Supreme Court considered 
lone parent could be an example of status under Article 14 of the ECHR. The children of the 
parents were also encompassed within this status as family members of the lone parents taking 
into account Article 8 and Article 14 ECHR. Ultimately the claims failed, but this finding 
highlights that the disproportionate suffering of lone parent families can be viewed as a form 
of structural discrimination. Children covered by child support legislation will often be children 
of lone parents, although not all will be where the parent with care has a new partner. The 
recognition of children of lone parents as a special group, who need additional protection, 
highlights further why the Government needs to develop a policy which complies with its 
children’s socio-economic rights obligations. A good and effective child support policy can 
promote family well-being, through the reduction of poverty. Family and relational well-being 
is directly correlated with children’s socio-economic status, therefore a properly functioning 
child support system is essential for protecting the best interests of children for this particular 
group in society. If the Government does not build an appropriate child support system, which 
recognises its own responsibility to take measures, then it is failing to protect children’s socio-
economic rights. 
  
3.3 Child Support and the UNCRC  
3.3.1 Requirements under Article 27 
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Article 27 of the UNCRC is the provision that expressly deals with child support and the child’s 
living standards. The key feature of this provision is that it places responsibility for securing 
this standard of living with both the parents and the State. Article 27(1) recognises the right of 
every child to an adequate standard of living, which would include access to basic necessities 
such as food, clothing and heating. This goes beyond basic minimal needs (Redmond, 2008) 
and the provision creates no ceiling with the aspiration to continue to improve living standards. 
Without an adequate standard of living the principle of the best interests of the child cannot be 
fulfilled. The responsibility for securing this standard of living, to ensure the child’s 
development, lies predominantly with the parents (Art 27(2)). Where parents have adequate 
resources, states are free to impose higher levels of child support because there is no ceiling to 
Article 27(1), and the main aim is to fulfil children’s rights and improve their life chances. 
Article 27(3) requires that Contracting States take measures to assist parents in cases of need, 
and this has been recognised by the Supreme Court in DA and DS (per Lord Kerr [180]). The 
support envisaged requires States to take measures to assist parents in fulfilling their 
responsibilities to their child. This would include assisting parents in providing appropriate 
living conditions for their children (ComRC, 2006 [20]). This may result in the State having to 
provide financial support in place of, or in addition to child support, through a guaranteed 
maintenance scheme. In other cases it may be about providing services to support family well-
being. Therefore, although it is the child that must have their socio-economic rights protected, 
where parents are unable to do this Article 27(3) requires the State to support parents rather 
than the child directly. A potential weakness of this provision is that it is aspirational, vague 
and the lack of a ceiling means it can unclear when the provision has been fully met (Harris, 
2000; Fortin, 1998). However, it is clear that the basic right to an adequate standard of living 
must be fulfilled. The Government has a duty to make sure the child’s basic needs are covered, 
and where a child is living in poverty it is arguable that this requirement has not been met. 
By taking this dual approach to child support, the UNCRC expects and acknowledges that the 
realisation of children’s rights will be deeply connected and interdependent with the exercise 
of parental rights and responsibilities (Tobin, 2013), and also the resources available to them. 
It also recognises the role of Governments in supporting children and ensuring they have their 
needs met. In order to comply with Article 27(3) in accordance with Article 27(1), the 
Government must provide social assistance and benefit levels must be set at a suitable standard 
to provide an adequate standard of living (Harris, 2000). This is not currently happening due 
to various cuts made to the benefit system (see s2 and 3.2 above). Article 27(4) also requires 
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that State parties take measures to ensure the recovery of maintenance for the child, from the 
people who have financial responsibility for the child (emphasis added). This suggests that the 
child has a right to receive child support and it recognises that the State also has a responsibility 
in ensuring the enforcement of orders or agreements.  
There are a number of elements to Article 27. It is clear that the State has a duty to support 
parents, so that these parents can support their child. There is not a direct duty on the State to 
support the child (Redmond, 2008). However, the State must take measures to ensure the 
recovery of maintenance for the child, suggesting that the duties in relation to enforcement of 
child support are directed at the child rather than the parent. The child support then is directly 
for individual children, but any additional Government support is for the parents and family 
more generally, according to Article 27. This may create a conflict with the best interests of 
the child, which indicates there should be specific measures taken in regard to children to 
protect their best interests as well as for families more generally. Nolan argues that children’s 
rights to resources should be independent of the parent child relationship, and the delivery of 
resources to parents does not remove or nullify the obligation of the State to children (2014). 
This does not sit well with the State’s duty in the context of Article 27, but Article 26 recognises 
that every child has a right to benefit from social security. This benefit could still pass through 
parents and caregivers, rather than going directly to children, but the provision recognises that 
the child has a right to benefits, rather than the provision being only for parents. The State’s 
minimum obligation in relation to child support, which includes the provision of benefits, 
would also include benefits for the child when Article 27 is read with Articles 3 and 26 (see 
section 4, below). 
In order to comply with Article 27 the government needs to take an integrated approach to 
assisting parents (ComRC, 2006). This would include steps such as assistance to help parents 
achieve workable and enforceable child support agreements, adequate social assistance to top-
up maintenance payments, and/ or replace payments not made, the provision of properly funded 
childcare that is available for a sufficient number of hours to allow parents to make an informed 
choice about whether or not to return to work (Russel, 2008),6 ad adequate housing, tax or other 
benefits. This could include the adoption of employment, tax and welfare measures to 
encourage both parents’ active involvement in child rearing (Hodgkin and Newell, 2007, 236; 
                                                          
6 Free child care is currently available for 30 hours a week once children reach the age of three. For children 
younger than that parents in certain circumstances might get 15 hours free childcare per week. This might not be 
sufficient to make a return to work a viable choice. See for example the difficulty of using work to minimise the 
harsh impact of the two child policy (Sefton et al (2019) 16-17). 
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CRC, 2016a). Families need to have the ability and the freedom to make informed decisions to 
improve their life (Sen, 2000) so they can lead a life they value (Redmond, 2008).  The 
Government is required to take measures under Article 27 to allow families to do this. The 
socio-economic right provided for in Article 27 uses the language of responsibilities, but 
extends the duty beyond family responsibilities by placing primary responsibility with the 
parents and recognising that the State also has a responsibility. This includes a financial 
responsibility where the parent can only pay a small amount, a responsibility to ensure 
maintenance agreements are in place and upheld, and a responsibility to provide additional 
welfare measures to ensure both parents can provide for their child and participate in their 
child’s life.  
3.3.2 Failures of the current policy in relation to Article 27 
The current framework under the Child Support Act does not satisfy the requirements of Article 
27. The emphasis under the CSA is that the responsibility lies with the parents, rather than a 
dual responsibility between parents and the government. In addition to this fundamental issue 
with the framework, there are several problems with the current policy from a socio-economic 
rights point of view. There is no attempt to identify the needs of the child, there is no link 
between the child support policy and benefits policy, and there is no provision of guaranteed 
maintenance. The policy places responsibility solely with the parents, encourages them to reach 
private agreements and provides limited assistance with enforcement.  
The current child support formula, which is found in the Schedule 1 of the CSA and 
supplemented by the 2012 Regulations,7 requires the NRP to provide a percentage of their 
income to their child (known as a qualifying child).8 There are various rates applicable 
depending on the income of the NRP.9 The amount payable to the child is reduced where there 
                                                          
7 Child Support Maintenance Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2677). 
8 See s55 and s26 of the CSA for further information.  
9 For the basic rate, which applies to NRPs who earn between £200 - £800 per week, this is 12% for one child, 
16% for two children and 19% for three or more children. Where the parent earns more than this the rates to be 
paid on income between £800-£3000 per week are 9% for one child, 12% for two and 15% for three or more. 
Income is capped at £3000 for the purposes of the CSA. Where the NRP has a high income, top-up child support 
can be sought from the courts through Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989. The rate is calculated differently 
per additional children, because it was felt that the costs per child do not necessarily double. This only works 
where all the qualifying children live in the same household. Where the NRP earns less than £100 per week they 
pay a flat rate of £7 regardless of the number of children. Where income is between £100-£200 per week they 
pay the flat rate of £7 and 19% on the income above £100. On this basis if a NRP earns £180, they pay 19% of 
£80 which is £15.20. You then add the remaining £7, and the total amount owed is £22.20 per week. 
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are other relevant children,10 another qualifying child who lives in a different household, and 
in accordance with overnight stays.11 It is clear that the focus of the formula is on the 
circumstances of the NRP, and is therefore based purely on the concept of the duty to maintain, 
rather than the needs of the child. By way of an example we can consider Steve a parent who 
earns £300 per week. Steve has one daughter Jane who lives with his ex-partner. Steve must 
pay 12% of his weekly income to Jane under the CSA in order to comply with the duty to 
maintain.12 He must therefore pay £36 per week, which equates to £1872 per year. We can 
contrast this with Ben who also earns £300 per week, but has two qualifying children. However, 
his children (George (8) and Pippa (1)) live in different households. Ben must pay 16% of his 
weekly income in child support,13 and this is split equally between his two children.14 This 
means he must pay each child £24 per week, which is £1248 per year. There is a considerable 
difference between the money Jane receives and the money George and Pippa receive. This 
may not be problematic, but this depends on the living standards of each of the parties. George’s 
mother has remarried, she works part-time earning £350 per week and her new husband earns 
£850 per week. Arguably George’s needs can be catered for and the additional £24 per week 
from Ben may not make much difference to his daily life. On the other hand, Pippa’s mother 
is a single parent and is heavily reliant on benefits. She is unable to work because she will not 
be able to cover the cost of childcare, and she does not have family members close by who can 
help her with this. Pippa has a greater need for the additional money from Ben, and she would 
receive an additional £12 per week if her father did not have another child who lived in a 
different household. This demonstrates how the formula focusses on the duty to maintain and 
does not take into account other issues such as the needs of individual children and poverty. 
The other problem with the CSA, and the use of private ordering to reduce Government 
involvement, is that there is often no child support agreement in place or no enforcement of an 
agreement. When this is the case, child support is ineffective and cannot lift children out of 
poverty. This is very different to the position in Australia and the USA where most people have 
some form of agency agreement, but may opt to use private enforcement (Wikeley, 2006). In 
the UK if you want to use the agency you need to pay a £20 fee for a maintenance calculation, 
                                                          
10 A relevant child is a child who lives with the NRP. Where there are relevant children the formula deducts 
11% for one child, 14% for two children and 16% for three or more children from the NRPs income before the 
formula above is applied. 
11 See Reg 46 and Sch 1, para 7 for further details. 
12 Child Maintenance and other Payments Act 2008, sch 4, para 3. 
13 Ibid. 
14 This is known as apportionment. 
16 
 
although domestic violence victims are exempt from this fee.15 This fee is designed to make 
people think twice about using the statutory scheme (HC Deb, 2014). Essentially the UK policy 
focusses on removing legal and public services, reducing oversight, and leaving child support 
to purely private agreements. This then permits individuals to decide not to have an agreement, 
or fail to fulfil the terms of the agreement, because the law has become irrelevant. This is 
unfortunate because the law is an important symbol of legitimacy, which can change attitudes 
and behaviours (Freeman 2007; 1974).  In 2012, 43% of single parents on benefit had no 
maintenance agreement, and 58% of these parents did not want an agreement (Bryson et al, 
2013, 10). In many cases parents have private maintenance agreements outside the formal 
maintenance system. In the majority of cases people are expected to use “direct pay” to enforce 
these agreements, which means they organise the enforcement of child support privately.16 The 
Government Service17 which is responsible for child support does not track whether there is a 
child support agreement in place nor whether maintenance is paid where the agreement is 
private. This is regarded as a private matter for the family, and as such there is no compliance 
data on “direct pay” arrangements even though they account for two thirds of maintenance 
arrangements (Gingerbread, 2019). When the DWP carried out an evaluation of “direct pay” 
around half of the respondents with these arrangements reported their arrangements had either 
never started or had broken down (DWP, 2016). Generally the Government Service responsible 
is only notified of a non-payment if the person with care makes a complaint and informs them 
that the maintenance has not been paid. The Service might then just chase up that payment but 
leave the arrangement to be enforced under the “direct pay” system.  
The calculation is only moved to “collect and pay” at the discretion of the Government Service. 
Under s 4(2A) of the CSA the move to “collect and pay” will be granted either where both 
parties have agreed to this, or where the Service is satisfied that without these arrangements 
the maintenance is unlikely to be paid. The criteria for meeting this second requirement remain 
unclear (Gingerbread, 2019). “Collect and pay” is subject to fees, which impact more heavily 
on the NRP, therefore that parent is unlikely to agree to the transfer. This creates a barrier to 
enforcement where parents are not transferred to “collect and pay” when they need assistance 
with enforcement. If parents agree to assistance from the Service, then the NRP must pay an 
extra 20% on top of the maintenance calculation, and there is also a 4% reduction in the child 
                                                          
15 Child Support Fees Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/612) Reg 4. 
16  https://www.gov.uk/manage-child-maintenance-case/how-to-pay accessed 18 November 2019. 
17 The Government Service has had a number of names and functions. Firstly as the Child Support Agency, then 
CMEC (see Wikeley, 2006, for further information). It is now housed in the Department for Work and Pensions. 
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support received. If maintenance is assessed at £100 per week, the paying parent will then have 
to pay £120 and the parent with care will receive £96, rather than £100 (so the cost for the 
assistance is £24 and the paying parent has to front most of this). These fees are payable in all 
cases, including where there is a history of domestic violence. This is problematic given that 
private arrangements may continue to reinforce underlying power imbalances, and refusal to 
pay could constitute ongoing control behaviour following relationship breakdown (see for 
example Stark 2008, 2012; Crossman et al 2016). Charges for this limited assistance are 
unhelpful when relatively small amounts of money may be changing hands, and lower income 
earners already struggle to make regular payments (see for example Takeysu and Eldred, 2014; 
Andrews et al, 2011; Bryson, et al 2013). The reduction in child support available for the child 
also reduces the ability of child support to lift families out of poverty.  
Fees for utilising the service had been envisaged since the conception of the CSA (Wikeley, 
2006). The intention was that parents who could afford to pay should pay an appropriate fee. 
However, this was scrapped because the Agency’s horrendous performance made it impossible 
to justify these fees (Wikeley, 2006, 441-2). The Labour Government did not reintroduce the 
fees because the Agency was still not performing to an acceptable standard (DSS, 1999). 
Therefore, the introduction of fees in 2014 might indicate that the Government Service is 
performing well and orders are now enforced. Unfortunately, however, use of “collect and pay” 
does not automatically mean the order will be enforced, despite the charges for the use of the 
service (although the charge would only apply in regard to maintenance that was actually 
collected). In most cases the Government does not have a direct interest in whether or not the 
maintenance is actually recovered, and unfortunately they have exclusive power to take 
enforcement proceedings (Wikeley, 2006, 448; R Kehoe v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2005] UKHL 48 (Kehoe)). If guaranteed maintenance (see section 4 below) was a 
subsidiary requirement, when the order was not enforced, then there would be a direct interest 
to secure payment from the NRP. Data from 2017 shows that only 59% of parents on “collect 
and pay” were contributing to their maintenance liability (DWP, 2017, 8).  The Government 
discharged some of its obligations under Article 27(4) in the cases where the maintenance 
orders were enforced, particularly where the Service utilised the variety of enforcement 
measures available to secure this enforcement.18 However, these 59% of parents are only 
                                                          
18 The Government Service has a number of enforcement mechanisms at its disposal. There are some which the 
service can proceed with automatically, such as deductions from earnings (s31), deductions from bank accounts 
(s32A and B), deductions from benefits (s43) and deductions from a deceased’s estate (s43A). Other 
mechanisms, such as the instruction of bailiffs (s35) require a liability order, and the most obstructive measures 
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contributing to their maintenance liability. This does not mean that the obligations have been 
discharged in full and the amount paid may only be a small percentage of the overall 
maintenance liability. These failings highlight that where the NRP is not paying their full 
maintenance liability and/or that liability is not sufficient to provide the child with an adequate 
standard of living then the Government is not fulfilling its responsibility under Article 27 
UNCRC. 
The DWP also found that there are particular problems with private agreements and private 
enforcement in cases where there is domestic violence, or in situations where there is no contact 
between the child and the NRP (2016 (see for example Takeysu and Eldred, 2014, 155; 
Andrews et al, 2011; Wikeley, 2006, 485). It is extremely difficult to set up working 
maintenance arrangements where the parties do not speak to each other and sometimes have 
no way of contacting each other. The focus on individual responsibility  does not consider 
underlying problems like poverty and domestic violence and how interrelated issues, such as 
stress and other psychological illnesses stemming from financial problems (Ghate and Hazel 
2002), may prevent somebody from paying child support or being able to go to work (Russel 
et al 2008). Russel et al have found that parents who consider they cannot provide options, 
activities and opportunities for their children feel guilty (2008; Sefton et al 2019). This is 
because poverty and its correlates can ‘sap parental energy, undermine parental sense of 
competence, and reduce parental sense of control’ (Edin and Lein, 1997).  This indicates that 
certain groups will be more affected by the policy than others, and those living in poverty will 
be hit doubly hard as they will not receive the child support which may otherwise lift them out 
of poverty.  
Article 27 requires that the State steps in to ensure that the child has adequate resources, where 
the parents are unable to do this, or provide assistance to help parents support their children. 
The Government does not currently provide additional resources where parents cannot or do 
not pay and has consistently reduced social welfare payments over the last few years. It also 
scrapped poverty measures against the advice of those who responded to the Government 
consultation (Stewart and Roberts, 2019). If there is no assessment of the needs of the child, 
and no measurement of poverty, then it is very difficult to determine when the Government 
needs to step in to provide additional financial relief for the child and fulfil its obligations under 
                                                          
such as license withholding and imprisonment should only be used as a matter of last resort (see below at s3.4). 
The enforcement mechanisms are each subject to their own fees. For further information on enforcement 
mechanisms see for example Wikeley (2006) and Walker (2018). 
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Article 27. By pushing responsibility into the hands of the parents, the Government is not 
complying with its minimum obligations in Article 27 UNCRC. 
3.3.3 Maximum available resources 
Enabling children’s socio-economic rights is largely dependent on the well-being and resources 
available to their parents, or others responsible for their care (ComRC, 2006 [20]). This is 
because children have needs and rights which are linked to the family structure as a whole, and 
beyond that to wider social structures and interconnections between social contexts within the 
wider ecosystem (Bronfenbenner, 1979). This indicates that poverty is relative and is linked to 
wealth in British society overall. Unfortunately the UK has one of the lowest unemployment 
benefit rates (Deeming and Smyth, 2015 and see section 2 above), which indicates that the 
level of poverty in certain sectors of society is not relative to the living standards of society as 
a whole.  
International human rights treaties, such as the UNCRC and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), require that States allocate maximum 
available resources to protect socio-economic rights, which includes fulfilling their obligations 
under Articles 27 and 26. The concept of maximum available resources should not be 
interpreted narrowly (Vandenhole, 2014; ComRC, 2003), and should reflect the wealth of the 
country. During times of austerity cuts may be required, but there needs to be limits to any cuts 
so that policy changes resulting in cuts are temporary, and any cuts must be necessary and 
proportionate (Vandenhole, 2014; CESCR, 2012). Retrogressive measures are subject to 
heightened scrutiny by human rights organisations (Landau, 2012), and where such measures 
are taken children, particularly those in vulnerable situations, should be the last to be affected 
(ComRC 2003; 2016a). Unfortunately the cuts made by the Conservative Government fall 
disproportionately on the poor and those who are least able to bear it (O’Connell, 2013; Alston, 
2018). Such drastic cuts which hit the poorest sector of the population should not be necessary 
in the British economy. Government budgets sometimes support deliberate Government 
priorities, such as austerity and independence, rather than being more generally designed to 
ensure they prioritise the needs and rights of human beings (Collins, 2019; Elson, 2012; 
O’Connell, 2013). In order to protect human rights Governments need to find a method to deal 
with austerity which does not simply cut services for those who need them the most. The 
austerity measures in the UK go beyond what is necessary and relative to the overall wealth of 
society (Alston, 2018). The Committee on the Rights of the Child has reported that the UK is 
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failing to undertake its responsibility to implement welfare and other social measures to prevent 
child poverty and implement children’s rights (ComRC, 2016b).  
 The heart of the implementation of children’s socio-economic rights lies in the provision of 
sufficient human, technical and financial resources, which contribute to the general measures 
consistently reinforced by the UNCRC (McCall-Smith, 2019). The provision of these human 
and financial resources are necessary if the Government is going to fulfil its human rights 
obligations in relation to child support. In order to provide for these needs the Government 
must provide for adequate public social provision, which would include access to housing and 
other vital resources and the provision of shared public goods (Galbraith, 2018). Galbraith 
argues that we can never rely purely on private provision because of changes such as loss of 
work, so adequate public provision must always be available (2018).  
 
3.4  The interpretation of Articles 3 and 27 UNCRC by the UK courts  
There are three ways in which the judiciary can utilise the UNCRC in their decisions. Firstly, 
it can be used to interpret legislation, when the meaning of the UK legislation is in doubt. 
Secondly it may guide the development of the common law. Thirdly, and most importantly, it 
may be relevant where the court is applying the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) via the Human Rights Act 1998 (SG [2015], per Lord Hughes [137]; Gilmore (2017)). 
More controversially Lord Kerr argues that the UNCRC should be directly applicable in court 
on the basis of legitimate expectations (SG [243]-[257]). He considers that there should be an 
exception to the dualist theory in human rights cases and refers to earlier case law that relies 
on legitimate expectations. The main premise of his argument is that the dualist theory is 
designed to protect citizens from abuses by the executive (SG [255]). Therefore, if this is the 
case the best way of protecting citizens against human rights abuses is to allow them to directly 
enforce their rights in court. There is merit to this argument, and this fourth strand could 
increase the protection of children and allow greater oversight of the executive in children’s 
rights cases if it could gain wider acceptance from the judiciary. 
Of the three accepted stands, the best weapon in case law relating to children’s socio-economic 
rights is where the court is applying the ECHR (see for example SG; DA and DS; Smith (FC) 
v Secretary of State for Work Pensions and Another [2006] UKHL 35 [77] (Smith); Kehoe). 
Therefore, the link between Articles 3 and 27 of the UNCRC and the broadly phrased and 
interpreted Article 8 of the ECHR (right to private and family life) is essential if children’s 
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socio-economic rights are to be developed and protected by the UK courts. As Lord Kerr 
explains in DA and DS, ‘the values underlying the right of all appellants to respect for their 
family life include those of a home life underpinned by a degree of stability, practical as well 
as emotional, and thus by financial resources adequate to meet basic needs, in particular for 
accommodation, warmth, food and clothing’ (2019 [35]). This phrase strikes at the heart of 
children’s socio-economic rights, and hints at child well-being more broadly. Although it is 
disappointing the UNCRC is not directly applicable, this demonstrates that children’s socio-
economic rights can for these purposes be protected through Article 8 ECHR, which can be 
interpreted in light of the UNCRC. 
A key case which considered child support and human rights is Kehoe. The case looked at the 
issue of access to court in relation to the enforcement of child maintenance, and it turned on 
Article 6 rather than Article 8 ECHR. The case does not frame child support as a right. 
However, Kehoe does not prevent the framing of child support as a right. The problem with 
Kehoe is the case is not wide enough to give us an answer to this question, so the decision 
should not be used to suggest that there is not a right to child support. In her dissenting 
judgment in Kehoe Lady Hale takes a broader view of child support and indicates that you can 
only answer the question properly if this perspective is taken. The majority focussed on the 
issues raised by Mrs Kehoe, which were too narrow, and the problem therefore is the question 
posed rather than the judgment itself rejecting child support as a question of socio-economic 
rights. This point is made more clearly by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which 
specifically emphasises that it is not ruling on whether there is a civil right to maintenance but 
purely whether there has been a breach of Article 6, in the sense that Mrs Kehoe did not have 
access to a court or a tribunal (Kehoe v United Kingdom App. No. 2010/06 [2008] FLR 1014). 
The ECtHR considered that because Mrs Kehoe did have access to court via judicial review 
there was no violation of Article 6. Under Article 27(4) State parties have to take measures to 
ensure the recovery of maintenance for the child, but there is no specific requirement on how 
they should do this. What is clear is that the measures need to be effective in order for the 
obligation to be discharged. The Government Service does have a number of enforcement 
measures available to them, however, it is questionable whether these measures are effective 
because the Service is not keen to step up and assist parents with enforcement, and the fees act 
as a barrier to those who could benefit from the service (see s3.3.2 above). The decision in 
Kehoe does not help with this concern. The system might be more effective if the Government 
had a direct interest in recovering maintenance for the child. 
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A year later in Smith, the court specifically refers to Article 27 UNCRC. Lady Hale, who forms 
part of the majority, takes a children’s rights approach in a case where two interpretations of 
the law were possible [77]-[78]. The case concerned the interpretation of the phrase “total 
taxable profits…as submitted to the Inland Revenue, when determining the earnings of a self-
employed parent.” The issue was whether capital allowances, allowed as deductions for tax 
purposes, could also be deductions for the purpose of a child support calculation.19 The 
majority held that capital deductions should not be made when calculating child support, 
deploying the interpretation which best complies with the best interests of the child.  
The UNCRC was also referred to by the Court of Appeal in other cases such as Karoonian v 
CMEC; Gibbons v CMEC [2012] EWCA Civ 1379 (Gilmore, 2017). These joined cases 
concerned liability proceedings in respect of fathers who had not paid the child support they 
were required to pay. The fathers argued that the committal proceedings did not respect their 
right to a free trial under Article 6 ECHR. The Court of Appeal referred to Lady Hale in Smith 
and commented that enforcement by commitment to prison achieves a reasonable relationship 
between the aim of achieving enforcement (as required by the UNCRC) and the means 
employed to do this (Karoonian [12]). However, in these cases the Court found in favour of 
the fathers. Even though the threat of imprisonment, by way of a suspended sentence, is a 
legitimate enforcement mechanism it should only used as a method of last resort where there 
was evidence that the NRP had wilfully refused or culpably neglected to pay.  In these cases 
CMEC had not provided suitable evidence in this regard, therefore the Court held reluctantly 
that the commitment should be set aside ([48]-[49]). These later cases help to show that Kehoe 
has not automatically ruled out a right to child support for all purposes, instead the judiciary 
has looked to the best interests of the child when interpreting the CSA 1991. 
 
4. Child support and the need for interaction with social security 
The Government must take steps to assist parents to pay child support. It also has a duty to 
support parents in meeting their child’s needs where the parents financially cannot, or can only 
provide a small amount towards those needs (see section 3.3.1 above). Therefore, in order for 
the Government to fulfil its obligations under Article 27 it needs to consider the interaction 
                                                          
19 In this particular case the deduction of capital allowances would make a substantial difference when assessing 
the child support liability. ‘If he was entitled to a deduction for capital allowances, his earnings for the 2000–
2001 tax year, for child support purposes, were £20,892. If he was not entitled to the deduction, his earnings 
were £169,520’ (Smith [53]). 
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between child support and social security under Article 26 of the UNCRC. Article 26 requires 
that every child has a right to social security in accordance with the resources and 
circumstances of the child, and those having responsibility for them. Therefore, all children 
have their own entitlement to social security, but children who only live with one of their 
parents have a right to child support over and above any benefits they are entitled to. 
One positive element of the current child support framework, which should be retained under 
the new framework, is that most of the money recovered is paid directly to the parents rather 
than to the public purse (Miles, 2011, 101). This is positive in the sense that when the NRP 
does pay child support  the parent with care gets to retain this money on top of any benefits 
which can help alleviate poverty (Cuesta and Meyer, 2014; Skinner et al 2012; Hakovirta 2012; 
Cuesta et al 2018). This is necessary as the limited benefits available are insufficient to support 
lone parents and their children, because they have a higher risk of poverty than the wider 
population (see sections 2 and 3 above). However, the current system does not go far enough 
because it works on the assumption that child support is paid, when often it is not (section 3.3.2 
above). Where there is no maintenance agreement, or an agreement is in place but not enforced, 
then there is no guaranteed child maintenance in the UK as an alternative provision for the 
child. The person with care and therefore the child do not receive the money they are otherwise 
entitled to.  
Some other countries have guaranteed schemes of child maintenance, so that the parent 
receives state payments to compensate for lack of payment by the NRP, or supplement the 
amount the parent is able to pay (Hakovirta and Hiilamo, 2012). This means that the parent is 
guaranteed to receive a basic allowance to provide for the child. However, this money is not 
always treated as income specifically for the child, because sometimes deductions are made 
from the other social benefits that the parent is already entitled to. Therefore, where these 
schemes do not result in any extra income they do not improve family well-being, which is 
necessary for the protection of the child’s socio-economic rights. The positive effects of a 
guaranteed maintenance scheme are completely negated if this income is regarded when the 
State considers access to other benefits (Hakovirta et al, 2019; Skinner et al, 2017), because 
limited or no additional money may be provided. In countries where child support is treated as 
a complete substitute for social assistance, such as Germany and Finland, child support has no 
impact on the reduction of poverty (Hakovirta et al, 2019) because the parent does not receive 
any additional money to assist with their socio-economic progress. Although in some situations 
the benefits adults are entitled to might be sufficient money for that adult, they will not 
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necessarily provide enough money where that adult is also responsible for a child. Research 
clearly demonstrates that lone parents are particularly susceptible to poverty (see section 3.2 
above), highlighting that additional money is required to lift these families out of poverty. 
Replacing adult benefit with guaranteed child maintenance does not assist with the protection 
of the child’s socio-economic rights, because children should be entitled to resources that are 
independent of the resources allocated to their caregivers (Nolan, 2014, 9-10). Therefore, to 
best give effect to the child’s socio-economic rights the receipt of child support should not be 
regarded when considering an adult’s entitlement to benefits. Instead, recovered child support 
should be seen as a specific allowance for the child themselves to assist that child with socio-
economic progress and enhance their well-being and development, on the basis of need to 
provide adequate resources. If, for example, the basic need of children is assessed at £100 per 
week and the parents can only provide £50 per week, then there is a shortfall of £50. Therefore 
the child is entitled to the additional £50 under Article 26, which is assessed on the basis of the 
needs and resources of the child taking account of the circumstances of those having 
responsibility for the child. This would also mean that the Government is fulfilling its 
responsibility to provide assistance under Article 27. This should apply in all cases where there 
is a shortfall in the child support calculation, or when the child support arrangement is not 
enforced. (Where the arrangement is simply not enforced, the Government can claim the money 
back from the NRP. This means they will have a direct interest in enforcing the arrangement 
because otherwise they will have to provide guaranteed maintenance (to the value of the needs 
of the child) in cases where the parents should be able to provide for the needs of the child). 
This guaranteed amount is based on the needs of the child and should not have an impact on 
any other resources available to parents.  
This article has shown that child support is often not received, there is a lack of wider support 
around family wellbeing and enforcement, and the social security system is not fit for purpose. 
Therefore, the Government is not complying with its children’s socio-economic rights 
obligations because it is failing to ensure the appropriate provision of child support, which is 
supplemented by adequate benefits. Instead the Government has pushed child support into the 
private sphere, isolated it from benefits and absolved its own obligations. The Government has 
the ultimate responsibility to ensure children are adequately supported under Article 27. To do 
this it must assist parents to enable them to achieve working child support arrangements where 
possible and make a connection between child support and social security in order to protect 




5. The requirements of a new framework based on children’s socio-economic rights 
This article has demonstrated that the current child support policy is not a suitable method for 
providing children with adequate resources and has shown why a socio-economic rights 
approach to child support would be more suitable. This section will now suggest a new 
framework which complies with the Government’s children’s socio-economic rights 
obligations. The new framework must attempt to identify the needs of the child, reintroduce 
child poverty measures and include a link between child support and social security. The new 
framework must avoid placing responsibility solely with the parents, and instead recognise a 
dual responsibility between parents and Governments by removing the pressure on private 
agreements and removing charges for assistance with enforcement.  
Under the CSA there is no attempt to identify the needs of the child, nor the income of the 
caring parent. The formula only considers the income of the paying parent, any other 
dependents they might have and number of overnight stays (see section 3.3.2). This is a failure 
from a socio-economic rights perspective because the policy and law do not attempt to promote 
the well-being or the needs of the child and the caring parent. It simply provides that the parents 
are responsible for the child, therefore the NRP must pay a portion of income towards that 
child. This then provides an amount which the paying parent is expected to and considered able 
to pay.  This amount could be so low it makes relatively little difference to the caring parent, 
and if the paying parent has irregular work or a zero hour contract, it may be difficult for them 
to maintain regular payments (Takeysu and Eldred, 2014). Therefore, this formula is not 
fulfilling any wider social aims apart from the idea that parents are responsible for their 
children, under the principle of the “duty to maintain”. This is a relevant concept which is 
apparent in the children’s rights approach (Article 27), but there needs to be a more nuanced 
obligation which takes account of the needs of the child if children’s rights are to be fulfilled 
in this context. 
Initially the formula under the CSA tried to identify the needs of the child. Unfortunately these 
complicated formulas failed because the initial CSA tried to do too much at the same time, it 
tried to run before it could walk (King and Crewe, 2014). Other countries started with a simple 
formula, which got more complicated over time (Saue, 2014). In countries such as Australia, 
Finland and Denmark the formulas make an attempt to determine the needs of the child 
(Skinner, 2007). Sometimes, in countries like Norway, this also looks specifically at the age of 
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the child in relation to their potential needs (Skinner 2007, Saue et al 2014). Each system has 
its own variations and it may be difficult to come up with a perfect system, given that an 
assessment based on economic welfare alone will not necessarily prevent poverty (Waggle 
2002; Redmond 2008; Sen 2000). However, some attempt to identify the needs of the child in 
child support policy is necessary if the Government is going to comply with its children’s socio-
economic right’s obligations to ensure the child has adequate resources. For Pippa, who 
received £24 a week from Ben, there is an immediate shortfall if needs are assessed at £100 
per week. Here the Government would step in and pay £76 per week to reduce the shortfall, on 
the basis of needs. However, it may also be necessary to identify the income of the person with 
care which is done, for example, in Norway and New Zealand (Saue 2014; Skinner et al 2017). 
If the person with care is a lone parent then they may need additional assistance due to potential 
structural discrimination arising from this status, and the increased likelihood they will be 
living in poverty (see s 3.2 above). In the example above, George (Pippa’s half-sibling) had 
additional resources, because he lived in a dual-parent household where both parents worked. 
If the formula also considers the income of all carers then a higher portion of Ben’s income 
may go to Pippa over George. This is another way of reducing the Government’s liability whilst 
still providing adequate resources for children in line with Article 27. Therefore, including an 
assessment of the child’s needs, and the income of all carers in the formula, will assist in 
determining how much additional financial support from the Government is required in order 
to cater for the child’s socio-economic rights (see s 4 above). This should be supplemented by 
reinstating poverty measures, to determine whether children’s needs are appropriately 
measured and adequately accounted for through the child support and the welfare system. The 
Government must make up any shortfall, as required under Article 27(3), to ensure the child 
has access to adequate resources that fulfil their needs. 
Pushing child support into the private sphere is the other way the Government is failing in its 
children’s socio-economic rights responsibilities. Instead the Government must provide full 
support in cases where parents cannot make private agreements, such as those involving 
domestic violence or where the relationship between them has completely broken down.  The 
Government needs to provide suitable avenues for securing child support enforcement which 
are easier to access, do not cost money, and therefore do not penalise children and parents. The 
Government needs to commit to providing maximum available resources to assist parents and 
children in need, which should be in line with the wealth of the nation. Where the Government 
secures enforcement, from those who are able to pay, by appropriately supporting parents, it 
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will reduce its liability to provide guaranteed maintenance where the parents can cover the 
financial needs of the child themselves. All services need to be available to any parent who 
wants to access them. Parents who do not need the assistance are unlikely to request assistance 
from the services available in any event (see Felbherg 2013). 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that the current Child Support framework is not fit for purpose 
because it does not comply with children’s rights as it fails to ensure children have access to 
adequate resources. The CSA is instead based on the duty to maintain through individual 
responsibility, without any consideration of the needs or rights of children. The Act also fails 
to consider what the Government responsibility might be where the parent is unable to pay a 
sufficient amount of child support. Child support is often not received, there is a lack of wider 
support around family wellbeing and enforcement, and the social security system is arguably 
not fit for purpose. By taking this limited approach to child support the Government has failed 
to fulfil its responsibilities in relation to children’s socio-economic rights, because it is failing 
to ensure the appropriate provision of child support, which is supplemented by adequate 
benefits. The UNCRC takes a dual approach to child support, placing responsibility with 
parents and the Government to ensure the child grows up with adequate resources. In order to 
fulfil this requirement the Government must allocate maximum available resources in line with 
the wealth of the nation. This article has considered the requirements in Article 27, as well as 
Articles 3, 4 and 26, UNCRC to demonstrate that the framework does not meet the 
requirements that the State promised to fulfil when it ratified the UNCRC. 
The protection of socio-economic rights is necessarily related to family well-being and the 
reduction of poverty.  Child support provides children and their carers with subsistence, which 
will reduce poverty if paid regularly. Governments need to ensure appropriate mechanisms are 
in place to recover child support for children. In cases where the parent is unable to pay, or the 
amount they can pay is insufficient to meet the needs of the child, the Government should 
provide money to reduce poverty. The Government and relevant bodies must support families, 
as appropriate, in order to ensure that children’s needs are met. The Government needs to think 
about socio-economic factors and larger social justice issues when addressing child wellbeing, 
and child support, and recognise that parent’s may need some assistance in order to resolve 
certain problems that relate to their family (Hearn, 2011). The complex structural conditions 
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of poverty need to be addressed by the State. Therefore a law and policy on child support which 
complies with children’s socio-economic rights is the best way to address this issue as it 
recognises the responsibility of multiple people and the need for multiple factors to be 
addressed. It also recognises the need for support for families and the necessity to move away 
from parental blaming. The Government has not done this and therefore the current child 
support policy does not work because child support continues to go unpaid, and the policy does 
not fulfil international obligations to secure socio-economic rights for children. 
The article identifies a new framework which complies with socio-economic rights, focuses on 
children's needs and considers how the child support system can interact with the benefits 
system in order to adequately cater for a child's needs and support child well-being. The 
Government must assist parents to enable them to achieve working child support arrangements 
where possible, and make a connection between child support and social security in order to 
protect children’s socio-economic rights.  These changes should improve overall family 
wellbeing and help lift children of lone parents out of poverty. This new framework needs to 
include the reinstation of poverty targets to help determine need. This approach means the 
Government can utilise the child support system to protect children’s socio-economic rights 
and shield children from the detrimental effects of poverty. This would secure better long-term 
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